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Abstract. Over time, hardware designs have constantly grown in com-
plexity and modern platforms involve multiple interconnected hardware
components. During the last decade, several vulnerability disclosures
have proven that trust in hardware can be misplaced. In this article, we
give a formal definition of Hardware-based Security Enforcement (HSE)
mechanisms, a class of security enforcement mechanisms such that a soft-
ware component relies on the underlying hardware platform to enforce a
security policy. We then model a subset of a x86-based hardware platform
specifications and we prove the soundness of a realistic HSE mechanism
within this model using Coq, a proof assistant system.
1 Introduction
Modern hardware architectures have grown in complexity. They now are made of
numerous devices which expose multiple programmable functions. In this article,
we identify a class of security enforcement mechanisms we call Hardware-based
Security Enforcement (HSE) such that a set of software components configures
the hardware in a way which prevents the other software components to break
a security policy. For instance, when an operating system uses the ring levels
and memory paging features of x86 microprocessors to isolate the userland ap-
plications, it implements a HSE mechanism. A HSE mechanism is sound when
it succeeds in enforcing a security policy. It requires (1) the hardware functions
to provide the expected properties and (2) the software components to make a
correct use of these hardware functions. In practice, both requirements are hard
to meet.
First, hardware architectures comprise multiple interconnected devices which
interact together. From a security perspective, it implies considering the devices
both individually and as a whole. Hardware functions are not immune to se-
curity vulnerabilities. For instance, early versions of the sinit instruction im-
plementation of the Intel TXT technology [13] allowed an attacker to perform a
privilege escalation [21]. The legitimate use of a hardware mechanism can also
break the security promised by another. For instance, until 2008, the x86 cache
allowed to circumvent an access control mechanism exposed by the memory con-
troller [17,22]. Secondly, hardware architectures have grown in complexity and,
as a consequence, HSE mechanisms too. There are many examples of security
vulnerabilities which are the consequence of an incorrect HSE mechanism im-
plementation [5,26,9].
In this paper, we introduce SpecCert, a framework for specifying and verify-
ing HSE mechanisms against hardware architecture models. SpecCert relies on
a three-steps methodology. First, we model the hardware architecture specifica-
tions. Then we specify the software requirements that must be satisfied by the
trusted software components which implement the HSE mechanism. Finally, we
prove that the HSE mechanism is sound under the assumption that the software
components complies to the specified requirements. This implies the hardware
involved in the HSE mechanism indeed provides the security properties they
promise. We believe this approach to be beneficial to both hardware designers
and software developers. The former can verify their hardware mechanism as-
sumptions and the latter can get a formal specification to implement the HSE
mechanism.
In Section 2, we give a formal definition of the SpecCert formalism. In Sec-
tion 3, we define a model of x86-based hardware architectures to verify HSE
mechanisms targeting software isolation policies using publicly available Intel
specifications. In Section 4, we verify the soundness of the HSE mechanism im-
plemented in many x86 computer firmware codes to isolate the code executed
while the CPU is in System Management Mode (SMM), a highly privileged
execution mode of x86 microprocessors. Our model and proofs have been im-
plemented using Coq, a proof assistant system and have been released as an
open source software 3. We discuss our results in Section 5, some related works
in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 The SpecCert Formalism
In SpecCert, we model the hardware architecture and its features with a set of
states H, a set of events E and a Computing Platform Σ which defines a se-
mantics of events as state-transformers. Hence, the execution of a set of software
components by a hardware architecture is a sequence of state-transformations
(denoted h ev−−−→
Σ
h′) in this model. In this paper, we consider exclusively Ex-
ecution Monitoring (EM) enforceable security policies [24,4] that are security
policies which can be enforced by monitoring the software execution. As a con-
sequence, we model a security policy with a predicate P on sequences of state-
transformations. Finally, we model a HSE mechanism ∆ with a set of require-
ments on states to characterize safe hardware configurations and a set of require-
ments on state-transformations for trusted software components to preserve the
state requirements through software execution. A HSE mechanism is sound when
every sequence of state transformations which satisfies these requirements also
satisfies the security policy predicate.
3 Which can can be found at: https://github.com/lethom/speccert
2.1 Computing Platforms
We now dive more deeply into the SpecCert formalism and give a formal def-
inition of the Computing Platform. We model a hardware architecture which
executes several software components using states, events and a semantics of
events as states-transformers.
The state of a hardware architecture models the configuration of its devices
at a given time. This configuration may change over time with respect to the
hardware specifications and comprises any relevant data such as registers values,
inner memory contents, etc. A hardware architecture state update is triggered
by some events. We distinguish two classes of events: the software events which
are direct and forseeable side-effects of the execution of an instruction and the
hardware events which are not. The execution of an instruction can be broken
down into a sequence of software events.
For instance, to execute the x86 instruction 4 mov (%ecx),%eax, a x86 CPU:
– reads the content of the register ecx as an address
– reads the main memory at this address
– writes this content into the register eax
– updates the register eip with the address of the next instruction to execute
We model this sequence of actions as four software events which trigger four
state updates. Note that if the content of the ecx register is not a valid address,
the scenario is different. In such a case, the read access to the main memory
fails and an interrupt is raised. This second scenario is modeled with another
sequence of events which involved a hardware event i.e. the interrupt.
The semantics of events as state-transformers is specified using preconditions
and postconditions. Preconditions specify the state requirements which are nec-
essary for an event to be observed. Postconditions specify the consequences of
an event on the hardware architecture state.
Definition 1 (Computing System). Given H a set of hardware architec-
ture states and E a set of events, a Computing Platform Σ is a pair of (pre-
condition, postcondition) where precondition is a predicate on H×E and post-
condition is a predicate on H × E × H. Σ defines a semantics of events as
state-transformers such as
precondition(h, ev) postcondition(h, ev, h′)
h
ev−−−→
Σ
h′
h
ev−−−→
Σ
h′ is called a state-transformation of Σ.
2.2 Security Policies
Given H a set of states of a hardware architecture, E a set of events, Σ a
Computing Platform and S a set of software components being executed by the
hardware architecture, a particular execution of a set of software components is
modeled with a sequence of state-transformations we call a run of Σ.
4 Written in AT&T syntax here.
Definition 2 (Run). A run of the Computing Platform Σ is a sequence of
state-transformations of Σ such that for two consecutive transformations, the
resulting state of the first is the initial state of the next. We denote R(Σ) the
set of runs of the Computing Platform Σ and init(ρ) the initial state of a run ρ.
We consider EM-enforceable security policies [24,4] specified with predicates
on runs. A run is said to be secure according to a security policy when it satisfies
the predicate specifying this policy.
In this paper, we focus on a class of security policies we call software execution
isolation policies. Such a policy prevents a set of untrusted software components
to tamper with the execution of another set of so-called trusted software com-
ponents. We consider that a software component tampers with the execution of
another when it is able to make the latter execute an instruction of its choice.
In practice, a subset of states of the hardware architecture is dedicated to
each software component. For instance, the x86 CPU has a feature called pro-
tection rings where each ring can be seen as an execution mode dedicated to
a software component. Hence, the ring 0 is dedicated to the operating system
whereas the userland applications are executed when the CPU is in ring 3. In
SpecCert, we take advantage of this CPU state sharing to infer which software
component is currently executed from a hardware architecture state. For the
following definitions, we assume the hardware architecture contains only one
CPU.
Definition 3 (Hardware-Software Mapping). A hardware-software map-
ping context : H → S is a function which takes a hardware state and returns
the software component currently executed.
Dealing with multi-core architectures would require additional efforts and
notations. One possible solution could be to define an identifier per core and to
use this identifier in addition to the current hardware state to deduce the software
component currently executed by the corresponding core. However, this is out
of the scope of this article.
We now introduce the concept of memory location ownership. A memory lo-
cation within a hardware architecture is a container which is able to store data
used by a software component e.g. a general-purpose register of a CPU, a DRAM
memory cell, etc. We say that a Computing Platform tracks the memory location
ownership if the hardware architecture states maps each memory location with
a software component called its owner, and the Computing Platform semantics
updates this mapping through state-transformations. A software component be-
comes the new owner of a memory location when it overrides its content during
a state-transformation. By extension, we say a software component owns some
data when it owns the memory location in which these data are stored.
With this mapping, it becomes possible to determine the owner of an instruc-
tion fetched by the CPU in order to be decoded and executed.
Definition 4 (Event-Software Mapping). An event-software mapping fet-
ched : H×E → P(S) is a function which takes an initial hardware state and an
event and returns the set of the fetched instructions owners during this state-
transformation.
Hence, s ∈ fetched(h, ev) means that an instruction owned by s was fetched
during a state-transformation triggered by an event ev from a state h. With a
hardware-software mapping and an event-software mapping, we give a formal
definition of a software execution tampering.
Definition 5 (Software Execution Tampering). Given h the initial state
of a state-transformation triggered by an event ev, context a hardware-software
mapping, fetched an event-software mapping and x, y ∈ S two software compo-
nents, the software component y tampers with the execution of another software
component x if the CPU fetches an instruction owned by y in a state dedicated
to x.
software_tampering(context, fetched, h, ev, x, y) ,
context(h) = x ∧ y ∈ fetched(h, ev)
Given T ⊆ S a set of trusted software components, the software execution
isolation policy prevents the untrusted components from tampering with the
execution of the trusted components. Such a policy is enforced during a run
if no untrusted component is able to tamper with the execution of a trusted
component.
Definition 6 (Software Execution Isolation). Given context a hardware-
software mapping, fetched an event-software mapping and ρ a run of Σ,
software_execution_isolation(context, fetched, ρ, T ) ,
∀h ev−−−→
Σ
h′ ∈ ρ, ∀t ∈ T ,∀u 6∈ T ,
¬software_tampering(context, fetched, h, ev, t, u)
In this definition, t is a trusted software component and u is an untrusted
— potentially malicious or hijacked — one.
2.3 Hardware-based Security Enforcement Mechanism
A HSE mechanism is a set of requirements on states to characterize safe hardware
configurations and a set of requirements on state-transformations to preserve the
state requirements through software execution. The software components which
implement a HSE mechanism form the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
Definition 7 (HSE Mechanism). Given H a set of states of a hardware ar-
chitecture, E a set of events and Σ a Computing Platform, we model a HSE
mechanism ∆ with a tuple (inv, behavior, T , context) such as
– inv is a predicate on H to distinguish between safe hardware configurations
and potentially vulnerable ones
– behavior is a predicate on H × ESoft to distinguish between safe software
state-transformations and potentially harmful ones
– T ⊆ S is the set of software components which form the TCB of the HSE
mechanism
– context is a hardware-software mapping to determine when the TCB is ex-
ecuted
For instance, in x86-based hardware architectures, the SPI Flash contents
(the code and configuration of the firmware) is protected as follows:
1. By default, the SPI Flash is locked and its content cannot be overriden until
it has been unlocked
2. Some software components can unlock the SPI Flash
3. When they do so, the CPU is forced to start the execution of a special-
purpose software component
4. This software component has to lock the SPI Flash before the end of its
execution
In this example, the special-purpose software component is the TCB. A safe
hardware state (modeled with inv) is either a state wherein the special-purpose
software component is executed or a state wherein the SPI Flash is locked.
This requirement on hardware architecture states is preserved by preventing the
special-purpose software component to end its execution before it has locked the
SPI Flash (modeled with behavior).
For a HSE mechanism to be correctly defined, it must obey a few axioms,
together called the HSE Laws. The first law says that the state requirements
specified by inv are preserved through state-transformations if the software
transformations which do not satisfy behavior are discarded. The second law
says that the behavior predicate specifies state-transformations restrictions for
the TCB only. The software components which are not part of the TCB are
considered untrusted and we make no assumption on their behavior.
Definition 8 (HSE Laws). AHSEmechanism∆ = (inv, behavior, T , context)
has to satisfy the following properties:
1. behavior preserves inv: ∀h ev−−−→
Σ
h′,
inv(h)⇒ (ev ∈ ESoft ⇒ behavior(h, ev))⇒ inv(h′)
2. behavior only restricts the TCB: ∀x 6∈ T ,∀h ∈ H,∀ev ∈ ESoft,
context(h) = x⇒ behavior(h, ev)
A run complies to a HSE mechanism definition if its initial state satisfies
the state requirements and each state-transformation of the run satisfies the
state-transformations requirements. The set of the runs which comply with ∆ is
denoted by C(∆).
Definition 9 (Compliant Runs). Given ρ ∈ R(Σ),
ρ ∈ C(∆) , inv(init(ρ)) ∧ ∀h ev−−−→
Σ
h′, ev ∈ ESoft ⇒ behavior(h, ev)
Eventually, we aim to prove that a HSE mechanism is sound —it succeeds to
enforce a security policy— under the assumption that software components of the
TCB always behave according to the specification given in the HSE mechanism
definition.
Definition 10 (Sound HSE Mechanism). A HSE mechanism ∆ succeeds in
enforcing a security policy P when each compliant run of ∆ is secure. In such a
case, ∆ is said to be sound.
sound(∆,P ) , ∀ρ ∈ C(∆), P (ρ)
Notation Description
S Set of software components
H Set of states of the hardware architecture
E Set of states of events of the hardware architecture
Σ Semantic of events as state-transformers (Computing Platform)
h
ev−−−→
Σ
h′ State-transformation according to Σ
R(Σ) Set of sequences of Σ state-transformations (Runs)
P Predicate on run to model a EM-enforceable security policy
∆ Requirements on states and state-transformation (HSE mechanism)
Table 1. SpecCert CheatSheet
3 Minx86: a x86 Model
The SpecCert formalism is the foundation of the SpecCert framework. It com-
prises a set of high-level definitions to specify a HSE mechanism against a hard-
ware architecture model. In its current state, the SpecCert framework contains
a model of x86 called Minx86. Minx86 is intended to be a minimal model for
single core x86-based machines and we have used publicly available Intel docu-
ments [10,11,12] to define it.
3.1 Model Scope
The hardware architecture we are modeling with Minx86 contains a CPU, a
cache, a memory controller, a DRAM controller and a VGA controller 5 which
both expose some memory to the CPU.
Minx86 is meant to be a proof of concept of the SpecCert formalism and
thus is not exhaustive. In its current state of implementation, its scope focuses
on the System Management Mode (SMM) feature of x86 microprocessors.
5 A VGA controller is a hardware device which on we can connect a screen. It exposes
some memory to the CPU for communication purposes.
Hardware Specifications We consider the CPU can be either in System Manage-
ment Mode (SMM) or in an unprivileged mode. The SMM is "a special-purpose
operating mode provided for handling system-wide functions like power man-
agement, system hardware control, or proprietary OEM-designed code" [12]. It
is the most privileged execution mode of x86 processors. When a CPU receives a
special hardware interrupt called System Management Interrupt (SMI), it halts
its current execution and reconfigures itself to a specified state from which it
executes the code stored in memory at the address SMBASE + 0x8000. In
practice, the SMBASE value points to the base of a memory region called the
SMRAM. Leaving the SMM is done by executing a special purpose instruction
called rsm (for resume).
The CPU relies on a cache to reduce the Input/Output (I/O, that is a read
or write access to the memory) latency. We model one level of cache which stores
both data and instructions and we consider two cache strategies: uncacheable
(UC) and writeback (WB). With the UC cache strategy, the cache is not used and
all I/O-s are forwarded to the memory controller, whereas with the WB strategy,
the cache is used as much as possible 6. To determine which cache strategy to use,
the CPU relies on several configuration registers and mechanisms. One of them
is a pair of registers called the System Management Range Registers (SMRR)
which can only be configured when the CPU is in SMM. They are used to tell the
CPU where the SMRAM is and which cache strategy to use for I/O targeting
the SMRAM when the CPU is in SMM. When it is not in SMM, the CPU
always uses the UC strategy for I/O targeting the SMRAM. SMRR have been
introduced as a countermeasure of the SMRAM cache poisoning attack [17,22]
which allowed an untrusted code to tamper with the copy of the SMRAM stored
in the cache. The memory controller [11] receives all the CPU I/O-s which are not
handled by the cache and dispatches them to the DRAM controller or to the VGA
controller. It exposes a unified view (the memory map) of the system memory
to the CPU. The CPU manipulates this memory map with a set of addresses
called the physical addresses. The memory controller dedicates a special range
of physical addresses to form the SMRAM. The SMRAM is dedicated to store
the code intended to be executed when the CPU is in SMM.
Tracking the Memory Ownership The Minx86 definition is parameterized with
an hardware-software mapping (see Definition 3). The memory locations of
Minx86 Computing Platforms are either cache lines or memory cells exposed by
the DRAM controller or the VGA controller. The memory ownership is updated
through state-transformations according to three rules:
1. When a cache line gets a copy of a DRAM or VGA cell content, the owner
of this cell becomes the new owner of this cache line.
2. When the content of this cache line is written back to a memory cell, the
new owner of this memory cell is the owner of this cache line.
6 These cache strategies are explained in [12], Volume 3A, Chapter 11, Section 11.3
(page 2316 – 2317)
3. When a state-transformation implies the content of a memory location to
be overriden with a new value, the software currently executed becomes its
new owner.
Given S a set of software components, the set of states of Minx86 Computing
Platform hardware architecture is denoted by ArchiS and the set of Minx86
Computing Platform events is denoted by Event. Given context a hardware-
software mapping, we denote the Computing Platform Minx86 parameterized
with context 7 such that
Minx86(context) , (minx86_pre,minx86_post(context))
3.2 Hardware Architecture State
ArchiS is defined as the Cartesian product of the set of states of the CPU, the
CPU’s cache, the memory controller and the hardware memories exposed by
both the DRAM controller and the VGA controller. Each of these sets is defined
in order to model the hardware features we have previously described. We define
PhysAddr , { pai | i ≤ max_addr } the set of physical addresses the CPU uses to
perform I/O. The maximal address offset (denoted by max_addr here) is specific
to the CPU and may vary in time according to its addressing mode (real mode,
long mode, etc.), therefore we left its value as a parameter of our model. An
in-depth definition of ArchiS is given in appendix A.1.
We model the projection of the SMRAM in the memory map such that
pSmram , { pai | smram_base ≤ i ≤ smram_end }. The values of smram_base
and smram_end are specified in the memory controller specifications. It is the
software responsability to set the SMRR accordingly. We assume smram_end −
smram_base > 0x8000. This way, when the SMBASE contains the address of the
beginning of the SMRAM, the SMM entry point (that is SMBASE + 0x8000)
is in SMRAM.
The hardware architecture states are implemented in the SpecCert.x86.Archi-
tecture module (about 1 500 lines of code).
3.3 Events as State-Transformers
The set of events which trigger the state-transformations is denoted by Event.
As we said in Section 2.1, we distinguish hardware events denoted by EventHard
and software events denoted by EventSoft.
Table 2 lists the software events we consider in theMinx86 Computing Plat-
forms. We model the CPU I/O-s withRead(pa) andWrite(pa), the configuration
of the memory controller with OpenBitF lip and LockSmramc, the configura-
tion of the cache strategy with SetCacheStrat(pa, strat), the configuration of
the SMRR with UpdateSmrr(smrr) the exit of the SMM with Rsm and the
update of the CPU program counter register with NextInstruction(pa).
7 The related definitions and explanations are given on page 10.
Event Paramters Description
Write pa ∈ PhysAddr A CPU I/O to write at physical address pa
Read pa ∈ PhysAddr A CPU I/O to read at physical address
pa ∈ PhysAddr
SetCacheStrat pa ∈ PhysAddr
strat ∈ { UC, WB }
Change the cache strategy for pa to strat
(WB means write-back and UC means un-
cacheable)
UpdateSmrr smrr ∈ Smrr Update the SMRR content with the new
value smrr
Rsm — The CPU leaves SMM
OpenBitF lip — Flip the d_open bit
LockSmramc — Set the d_lock bit
NextInstruction pa ∈ PhysAddr The program counter register of the CPU
is set to pa
Table 2. List of software events
Event Description
Fetch A CPU I/O to fetch the instruction stored at the physical ad-
dress contained in the program counter register
ReceiveSmi A SMI is raised and the CPU handles it
Table 3. List of hardware events
The other causes of state-transformations are modeled using hardware events.
Table 3 lists the hardware events we consider in the Minx86 Computing Plat-
forms. Fetch models the I/O to fetch the instruction pointed by the program
counter register. ReceiveSmi models a System Management Interrupt being
risen and handled by the CPU.
We define minx86_fetched an event-software mapping for Minx86 Com-
puting Platforms (see Definition 4). The minx86_fetched function maps a
state-transformation to the set of software components which own an instruction
fetched during this state-transformation. In the case of Minx86, there is only
one event which implies fetching instructions: Fetch. Let o be the owner of the
instruction pointed by the program counter register in the formula
minx86_fetched(h, ev) ,
{
{ o } if ev = Fetch
∅ otherwise
We can determine o because Minx86 tracks the memory location ownership.
Given context a hardware-software mapping (see Definition 3), the precon-
dition predicate of the Computing Platform Minx86(context) is named min-
x86_pre and the postcondition predicate is named minx86_post(context). We
give an informal description of the minx86_pre and minx86_post(context) for
each event. These definitions have been implemented in Coq in the module Spec-
Cert.x86.Transition.
We first give the semantics of software events as state-transformers. A soft-
ware component can always read and write at any physical address. As a con-
sequence, the precondition for Read(pa) and Write(pa) always holds true. The
postcondition for Read(pa) and Write(pa) requires the memory ownership to
be updated according to the memories and cache state updates. The memory
controller enforces a simple access control to protect the SMRAM content in the
DRAM memory by forwarding the related I/O to the VGA controller when the
CPU is not in SMM. To determine the owner of the memory location which sees
its content overriden during a state transformation, the postcondition uses the
hardware-software mapping used to define the Computing Platform.
A software component can always update the cache strategy used for an I/O.
The postcondition for SetCacheStrat(pa, strat) requires only the cache strategy
setting for this physical address pa to change. The precondition for UpdateSmrr
requires the CPU to be in SMM. The postcondition requires the SMRR of the
CPU to be updated with the correct value, the rest of the hardware architecture
state being left unchanged.
A software component can jump to any physical address, hence the post-
condition for NextInstruction(pa) always holds true. The postcondition for
NextInstruction(pa) requires the program counter register to be updated with
pa. The OpenBitF lip precondition requires the SMRAMC register to be un-
locked. The postcondition requires the d_open bit to be updated. The Lock-
Smramc precondition requires the d_lock bit to be unset. The postcondition
requires the d_open bit to be unset and the d_lock bit to be unset.
We now describe the semantics of hardware events as state-transformers.
Fetch models the fetching of an instruction by the CPU. As a consequence,
the definition of its precondition and postcondition are the same as Read(pa)
with pa being the program register value. ReceiveSmi precondition requires the
CPU not to be in SMM because SMM is non-reentrant. The postcondition of
ReceiveSmi requires the program counter to be set with the smbase + 0x8000
(where smbase is the value of the SMBASE register of the CPU) and the CPU
is in SMM.
4 System Management Mode HSE
In [12], Intel states "the main benefit of SMM is that it offers a distinct and
easily isolated processor environment that operates transparently to the oper-
ating system or executive and software applications". For the SMM processor
environment to be isolated, the code executed when the CPU is in SMM needs
to implement a HSE mechanism. In this section, we formalize and verify this
mechanism against the model we have previously introduced.
4.1 Computing Platform and Security Policy
We consider three software components: the boot sequence code, the SMM code
and the OS code. During the boot sequence, only the boot sequence code is
executed and it loads both the OS code and the SMM code into memory. At
the end of the boot sequence, the OS kernel is executed. This OS kernel will
schedule different applications. Because applications are less privileged than the
OS kernel, we will not distinguish them from the kernel code. Thus, in the
following, OS code refers to both OS kernel and application codes.
At runtime, both the OS code and the SMM code can be executed. Our
objective is to evaluate the security provided by the hardware to isolate SMM
code from OS code. Thus, we define
S , { smm, os }
We assume the SMM is dedicated to the SMM code. Let cpu_in_smm :
ArchiS → { true, false } be the function which returns true if the CPU is
in SMM and false otherwise. We define smm_context a hardware-software
mapping such that
smm_context(h) ,
{
smm if cpu_in_smm(h) = true
os otherwise
Let Smmx86 be the Computing Platform such as
Smmx86 ,Minx86(smm_context)
We assume that both the OS code and the SMM code have been loaded in
distinct memory regions. In particular, all the SMM code has been loaded in
SMRAM. Our objective is to enforce a security policy which prevents the OS
code to tamper with the SMM code execution. This way, the SMM (which is
the most privileged execution mode of the CPU) cannot be used to perform an
escalation privilege. We define smm_security a predicate to model this security
policy such as given ρ ∈ Smmx86,
smm_security(ρ) ,
software_execution_isolation(smm_context,minx86_execute, ρ, { smm })
4.2 HSE Definition
We define ∆Smm to model the HSE mechanism applied by the SMM code such
that ∆Smm = (invSmm, behaviorSmm, { smm }, smm_context) (see Definition 7).
In order to enforce the SMM security policy, we have identified six require-
ments on states.
– When the CPU executes the SMM code, the program counter register value
needs to be an address in SMRAM.
– The SMBASE register was correctly set during the boot sequence to point
to the base of the SMRAM.
– The SMRAM contains only SMM code.
– For a physical address in SMRAM, in case of cache hit, the related cache
line content must be owned by the SMM code.
– In order to protect the content of the SMRAM inside the DRAM memory,
the boot sequence code has locked the SMRAMC controller. This ensures
that an OS cannot set the d_open bit any longer and only a CPU in SMM
can modify the content of the SMRAM.
– The range of memory declared with the SMRR needs to overlap with the
SMRAM.
The Appendix A.2 gives the formal definitions of each requirements and of
invSmm. We now define behaviorSmm. We only define two restrictions. First, we
force the SMM code execution to remain confined within the SMRAM. The rea-
son is simple: the OS code can tamper with the memory outside the SMRAM. As
a consequence, jumping outside the SMRAM is the best way to fail the security
policy. Secondly, we prevent the SMM code to update the SMRR registers as it
is the responsability of the boot sequence code to correctly set them.
behaviorSmm(h, ev) ,
smm_context(h) = smm
⇒ ((e = NextInstruction(pa)⇒ pa ∈ pSmram)
∧ (e 6= UpdateSmrr(smrr)))
For ∆Smm to be a HSE mechanism, we need to prove the two HSE Laws (see
Definition 8). The first law states the state requirements modeled with invSmm
are preserved through state-transformations if the transformations which do not
satisfy behaviorSmm are discarded. We prove this by enumeration of ev ∈ Event
and h ∈ ArchiSmm, we check that each requirement described previously is
preserved by ∆Smm. We use those intermediary results to conclude. The sec-
ond law states that the behaviorSmm predicate specifies state-transformation
requirements for the TCB only. In this use case, it means behaviorSmm should
always hold true when the OS code is executed by the hardware architecture.
By definition of behaviorSmm, smm_context(h) = smm is an antecedent of the
conditional.
Let smm_secure_transformation be a predicate which holds true when a
state-transformation does not imply the OS code to tamper with the execution
of SMM code.
smm_secure_transformation(h, ev) ,
¬software_tampering(smm_context,minx86_execute, h, ev, os, smm)
We prove that this predicate holds true for a state-transformation with re-
spect to the HSE mechanism. With this result, we can prove the HSE mechanism
is sound (see Definition 10).
Lemma 1 (Invariants Enforce Security). ∀h ev−−−→
Smmx86(ctx)
h′,
invSmm(h)
⇒ (ev ∈ EventSoft ⇒ behaviorSmm(h, ev)
⇒ smm_secure_transformation(h, ev)
Proof. By enumeration of ev ∈ Event and h ∈ ArchiS .
Theorem 1 (∆Smm is Sound).
sound(∆Smm, smm_security)
Proof. The "Invariants Enforce Security" lemma applies for one transition and
the first HSE law allows to reason by induction on runs.
5 Discussion
Our effort has been originally motivated by the disclosure of several vulnerabili-
ties targeting multiple x86 HSE mechanisms for the past few years [17,22,23,6,14].
These attacks do not benefit from a software implementation error but rather
from a flaw in the hardware specifications themselves. The result of our work is a
three-steps methodology for formally specifying and verifying HSE mechanisms
against a hardware architecture model. We believe each aspect is important.
First, the hardware architecture model can be used as a formal specification.
The main benefit of a formal specification is to avoid any ambiguity such as
the one we have found in [11]. One can read at Section 3.8.3.8, page 102 that
“the OPEN bit must be reset before the LOCK bit is set”. At the same page, in
the description of the LOCK bit, one can also read that “when [LOCK] is set
to 1 then [OPEN] is reset to 0”. We had modeled the second statement as the
behavior of the memory controller is not specified if the first statement is true 8
Minx86 as a formal specification does not suffer from the same flaw. However,
the scalability of our approach remains to be proven. Minx86 is far from being
complete, as it focuses on SMM-related mechanisms. It is hard to forsee the
amount of work required to write both a more realistic hardware model and the
related security proofs.
Secondly, a formal specification of a HSE mechanism will help software de-
velopers when the time comes to implement it. For instance, the Chapter 34,
Volume 3C of [12] about SMM is about 30 pages long, it gives many details on
how the SMM actually works, yet no section is actually dedicated to security.
On the contrary, our HSE mechanism definition gathers six requirements on
hardware configurations and two requirements on software executions to enforce
a well-defined security property. Even if the proofs only apply to an abstract
model, we believe it is a valuable improvement.
Lastly, the verification process of a HSE mechanism specification against a
hardware architecture model may help to highlight hidden flaws in the hardware
specifications assumptions. We take the example of the SMRAM cache poison-
ning attack [17,22], which has motivated the introduction of the SMRR. If an
attacker can set the proper cache strategy (WB) for the SMRAM physical ad-
dresses, then the code inside the SMRAM is loaded into the cache as soon as the
CPU in SMM is executing it. From this point forward —because the access con-
trol is enforced at the memory controller level— nothing prevents the attacker
8 If we had to actually implement the HSE mechanism, we would have to assume the
first was the correct one.
to tamper with it. The next time the CPU enters in SMM, it executes the code
stored in the cache. With a SMRR-less version of Minx86, we were not able to
conclude our HSE mechanism was sound: such a scenario draws attention of the
SpecCert user who is forced to investigate.
From our point of view, the clear separation between the hardware model,
the security properties and the HSE mechanisms to enforce those properties are
the main advantage of our approach, as two different use cases can be studied
against the same hardware model.
6 Related Works
Several formal models of x86 architectures have been defined. For instance, Greg
Morrisett et al. have developed RockSalt [20], a sandboxing policy checker, upon
such a model. Peter Sewell et al. have proposed a model for x86 multiproces-
sors [25] which aims at replacing informal Intel and AMD specifications. Andrew
Kennedy et al. have developed an assembler in Coq [15] which allows a devel-
oper to verify the correctness of a specification for an assembly code. These three
projects have modeled (a subset of) the x86 instruction set against an idealized
hardware. Our approach is different: we model the instructions’ side effects on a
hardware architecture model as close as possible to its specifications.
Our work is inspired by the efforts by Gilles Barthe et al. to formally verify an
idealized model of virtualization [1,2,3]. In this work, the authors have developed
a model of a hypervisor and have verified that the latter correctly enforces several
security properties among which the guest OSes isolation. From the SpecCert
perspective, a hypervisor relies on HSE mechanisms which could be specified
and verified using SpecCert and a more complete version of the Minx86 model.
To the best of our knowledge, the closest related research project is the work
of David Lie et al. They have used a model checker (Murϕ) to model and verify
the eXecute Only Memory (XOM) architecture [16]. The XOM architecture al-
lows an application to run in a secure compartment wherein its data are protected
against other applications and even a malicious operating system. The main dif-
ference with our approach is that the XOM security properties are enforced as-is
by a secure microprocessor without the need for a software component to config-
ure anything. On the contrary, we intend to specify ways to use sets of hardware
functions to enforce security policies.
From our point of view, the main limitation of the research previously de-
scribed, including SpecCert, is the gap between the model and the concrete ma-
chine. The recent efforts around the Proof Carrying Hardware (PCH) [18,19,8],
inspired by the research about Proof Carrying Code (PCC), is promising. The
main idea behind PCH is to derive a model from a hardware device implementa-
tion written in a Hardware Description Language (HDL). One of our objective
is to investigate the possibility to adapt the SpecCert formalism to the PCH
models.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused on a class of security enforcement mechanism we
called Hardware-based Security Enforcement (HSE). The contribution of this
article is threefold. First, we have proposed a formalism to specify and verify
HSE mechanisms against hardware architecutre models. Then, we have defined
a minimalist x86 model called Minx86. Finally, we have specified and verified
the HSE mechanism dedicated to enforce the SMM code execution isolation
against this model. Our model and proofs have been implemented in Coq 9. The
project is about 4 500 Lines of Code (LoC) including 190 definitions and 150
proofs (theorems and lemmas).
For now, our proofs are built against an abstract model of the hardware ar-
chitecture. One of the future work we aim to address is improving the scope of
Minx86 in order to provide to potential SpecCert users a more complete model
to use for verifying and specifying their x86-based HSE mechanisms. Ultimately,
we aim to extend these proofs to a physical hardware platform. Therefore, the
equivalence between the model and the implementation has to be established.
In this perspective, the Proof Carrying Hardware framework [7,18,19,8] is par-
ticulary interesting and we intend to investigate in this direction.
References
1. Barthe, G., Betarte, G., Campo, J.D., Luna, C.: Formally verifying isolation and
availability in an idealized model of virtualization. In: FM 2011: Formal Methods,
pp. 231–245. Springer (2011)
2. Barthe, G., Betarte, G., Campo, J.D., Luna, C.: Cache-leakage resilient os isola-
tion in an idealized model of virtualization. In: Computer Security Foundations
Symposium (CSF), 2012 IEEE 25th. pp. 186–197. IEEE (2012)
3. Barthe, G., Betarte, G., Campo, J.D., Luna, C., Pichardie, D.: System-level non-
interference for constant-time cryptography. In: Proceedings of the 2014 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. pp. 1267–1279.
ACM (2014)
4. Basin, D., Jugé, V., Klaedtke, F., Zălinescu, E.: Enforceable security policies re-
visited. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 16(1),
3 (2013)
5. Corey Kallenberg, Sam Cornwell, Xeno Kovah, John Butterworth: Setup For Fail-
ure: Defeating Secure Boot
6. Domas, C.: The Memory Sinkhole. In: BlackHat USA (july 2015)
7. Drzevitzky, S.: Proof-carrying hardware: Runtime formal verification for secure
dynamic reconfiguration. In: Field Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL),
2010 International Conference on. pp. 255–258. IEEE (2010)
8. Guo, X., Dutta, R.G., Mishra, P., Jin, Y.: Scalable SoC Trust Verification using
Integrated Theorem Proving and Model Checking. In: IEEE Symposium on Hard-
ware Oriented Security and Trust. pp. 124–129 (2016)
9. Intel: CHIPSEC: Platform Security Assessment Framework. http://github.com/
chipsec/chipsec
9 Our implementation is available here: https://github.com/lethom/speccert
10. Intel: Desktop 4th Generation Intel Core Processor Family, Desktop Intel Pentium
Processor Family, and Desktop Intel Celeron Processor Family
11. Intel: Intel 5100 Memory Controller Hub Chipset
12. Intel: Intel 64 and IA32 Architectures Software Developer Manual
13. Intel: Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT) (07 2015)
14. Kallenberg, C., Wojtczuk, R.: Speed racer: Exploiting an intel flash protection race
condition
15. Kennedy, A., Benton, N., Jensen, J.B., Dagand, P.E.: Coq: the world’s best macro
assembler? In: Proceedings of the 15th Symposium on Principles and Practice of
Declarative Programming. pp. 13–24. ACM (2013)
16. Lie, D., Mitchell, J., Thekkath, C., Horowitz, M., et al.: Specifying and verifying
hardware for tamper-resistant software. In: Security and Privacy, 2003. Proceed-
ings. 2003 Symposium on. pp. 166–177. IEEE (2003)
17. Loic Duflot, Olivier Levillain, Benjamin Morin, Olivier Grumelard: Getting into
the SMRAM: SMM reloaded CanSecWest
18. Love, E., Jin, Y., Makris, Y.: Proof-carrying hardware intellectual property: A
pathway to trusted module acquisition. Information Forensics and Security, IEEE
Transactions on 7(1), 25–40 (2012)
19. Makris, Y.: Trusted module acquisition through proof-carrying hardware intellec-
tual property. Tech. rep. (2015)
20. Morrisett, G., Tan, G., Tassarotti, J., Tristan, J.B., Gan, E.: Rocksalt: better,
faster, stronger sfi for the x86. In: ACM SIGPLAN Notices. vol. 47, pp. 395–404.
ACM (2012)
21. Rafal Wojtczuk, Joanna Rutkowska: Attacking intel TXT via SINIT code execution
hijacking
22. Rafal Wojtczuk, Joanna Rutkowska: Attacking SMM memory via intel CPU cache
poisoning
23. Rutkowska, J., Wojtczuk, R.: Preventing and detecting xen hypervisor subversions.
Blackhat Briefings USA (2008)
24. Schneider, F.B.: Enforceable security policies. ACM Transactions on Information
and System Security (TISSEC) 3(1), 30–50 (2000)
25. Sewell, P., Sarkar, S., Owens, S., Nardelli, F.Z., Myreen, M.O.: x86-tso: a rigorous
and usable programmer’s model for x86 multiprocessors. Communications of the
ACM 53(7), 89–97 (2010)
26. Yuriy Bulygin, John Loucaides, Andrew Furtak, Oleksandr Bazhaniuk, Alexander
Matrosov: Summary of Attacks Against BIOS and Secure Boot, def Con 22
A Appendix
A.1 Minx86 Set of States
To describe the hardware architecture state of Minx86 Computing Platforms,
we use record types and maps with the notations listed in Table 4. Given S a set
of software components, the set of states of the hardware architecture is denoted
by ArchiS .
ArchiS ,
{proc : Proc
; mc : MC
; mem : MemS
; cache : CacheS }
Notation Description
A , { field1 : T1
; field2 : T2 } Set of records definition
field1(a) Field selection
M , [A→ B] Set of maps definition
m[a] Map application
Table 4. List of notations
Proc denotes the CPU set of states, MC the memory controller set of states, MemS
the physical memories set of states and CacheS the cache set of states.
We define CacheStrat , { UC, WB } the set of the modeled cache strategies.
The set of states of the SMRRs is denoted Smrr.
Smrr , { range : P(PhysAddr)
; smram_strat : CacheStrat}
The set of physical addresses range tells the CPU the location of the SMRAM
and smram_strat tells which cache strategy has to be used when the CPU is
in SMM.
Proc ,
{ in_smm : { true, false }
; pc : PhysAddr
; smbase : PhysAddr
; smrr : Smrr
; strat : [PhysAddr→ CacheStrat] }
The boolean in_smm is set to true when the CPU is in SMM and to false
when it leaves it. The physical address pc models the program counter, a register
used to store the address of the next instruction to be fetched and executed.
The physical address smbase models the register of the same name. The map
strat abstracts away the numerous mechanisms of the x86 microprocessors to
determine which cache strategy to use for a given I/O.
The set of states of the Minx86 Computing Platforms memory controller is
denoted by MC.
MC , { d_open : { true, false }
; d_lock : { true, false } }
The two booleans d_open and d_lock model two bits of a configuration reg-
ister named smramc. They are used to determine how the memory controller
dispatches the I/O which targets a physical address of the SMRAM.
For a memory controller state mc ∈ MC to be consistent with respect to
the hardware specifications, it has to to verify that d_lock(mc) = true ⇒
d_open(mc) = false.
The memory controller translates physical addresses into hardware addresses
and forwards the I/O accordingly. We model this translation with the function
phys_to_hard : MC× { true, false } × PhysAddr→ HardAddr
which maps a state of the memory controller, a boolean which tells if the CPU is
in SMM or not and a physical address to a hardware address. It is important to
keep in mind that the same physical address can be translated into two different
hardware addresses for two memory controller states m and m′, hence it is
possible to have
phys_to_hard(m, b, pa) 6= phy_to_hard(m′, b, pa)
The physical memories state (exposed by the DRAM controller and the
VGA controller) is modeled with a mapping between the hardware addresses
and the software component which owns the related memory location. Given S
the set of software components, we denote MemS the set of states of the physical
memories.
MemS , [HardAddr→ S]
We assume Index is the set of cache indexes and index : PhysAddr→ Index
the function used by the CPU to determine which index to use for a given
physical address. The cache is divided into several cache lines which contain the
cached memory content and several additional information required by the cache
strategy algorithm. The set of states of the cache line is denoted by CacheLineS .
In addition to modeling the hardware specifications, the definition of CacheLineS
attaches a software owner to a cache line. We do not give more details about the
cache line model because the cache behavior is out of the scope of this article.
CacheS , [Index→ CacheLineS ]
In addition to the state definitions, we have implemented several helper func-
tions and predicates. For instance,
address_location_owner : ArchiS → PhysAddr→ S
Given a hardware architecture state and a physical address, returns the
memory content software owner
cache_hit : ArchiS → PhysAddr→ Prop
Given a hardware architecture state and a physical address, holds true if
the memory content is in the cache
cache_line_owner : ArchiS → Index→ S
Given a hardware architecture state and a cache line index, returns the
owner of this cache line
resolve_cache_strategy : ArchiS → PhysAddr→ CacheStrat
Given a hardware architecture state and a physical address, returns the
cache strategy used by the CPU for this address
translate_physical_address : ArchiS → PhysAddr→ HardAddr
Given a hardware architecture state and a physical address, returns the
result of the memory controller address translation
A.2 SMM Code Isolation: Charactezing a Safe State
In order to enforce the SMM security policy, we have identified six requirements
on states.
– When the CPU executes the SMM code, the program counter register value
needs to be an address in SMRAM.
smram_pc(h) , smm_context(h) = smm⇒ pc(proc(h)) ∈ pSmram
– The SMBASE register has been correctly set during the boot sequence.
valid_smbase(h) , smbase(proc(h)) = pasmram_base
– The SMRAM must contain only SMM code.
smram_code(s) , ∀ha ∈ hSmram,mem(h)[ha] = smm
– For a physical address in SMRAM, in case of cache hit, the related cache
line content must be owned by the SMM code.
cache_clean(h) ,
cache_hit(h, pa)
⇒ cache_line_owner(h, index(pa))
= smm
– In order to protect the content of the SMRAM inside the DRAM memory,
the boot sequence code has to lock the SMRAMC controller. This ensures
that an OS cannot set the d_open bit any longer and only a CPU in SMM
can modify the content of the SMRAM.
locked_smramc(h) , d_lock(mc(h)) = true.
– The range of memory declared with the SMRR needs to overlap with the
SMRAM.
valid_smrr(h) , pSmram ⊆ range(smrr(proc(h)))
invSmm(h) ,
smram_pc(h)
∧ valid_smbase(h)
∧ smram_code(h)
∧ cache_clean(h)
∧ locked_smramc(h)
∧ valid_smrr(h)
